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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL,

)
)

Plaintiff, Respondent )
and Cross-Appellant, )
vs.
RESORT CAMPERS LTD., DES
TOWNSEND and GLEN HATCH,
Defendants and CrossRespondents,
and
ROGER T. RUSSELL, TOM VOGEL,
LEWID TED COWLEY, DALE CHRISTIANSEN, JOHN H. WHITELEY, G~~N
D. DAVIDSON and UNITED BANK, a
Utah corporation,
Defendants and
Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case Nos. 18262 and 18263

~)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS RESORT CAMPERS LTD.,
DES TOWNSEND AND GLEN HATCH
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This proceeding was brought by plaintiff, American Manufacturers
Mutual, the issuer of aonce-renewedmotor vehicle dealer's bond,
against defendants, whom had made separate claims in separate
actions against plaintiff, to obtain a declaratory judgment that
plaintiff's total limit of liability to all claimants for all losses
was limited to $20,000 and that plaintiff could extinguish its
liability by depositing said sum with the Clerk of the Court.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff American Manufacturers Mutual, hereinafter the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"bond company", by motion, successfully moved the trial in the
instant declaratory judgment action into the trial setting which
had been scheduled for the action filed earlier by defendants Des
Townsend and Glen Hatch, the first of the defendants to obtain a
trial setting, and obtained deferral of the Townsend-Hatch setting.
In this action, tried by the Honorable Dean E. Conder on
December 16 and 17, 1981, the lower court entered a declaratory
judgment that the liability of the bond company was $20,000 as to
all claims and losses arising between October 31, 1978 and October 31,
1979, the period covered by the first bond premium, and $20,000 as
to all claims and losses arising between October 31, 1979 and April
13, 1980, the ·period

covered- by the payment of a second bond premium

to the effective date the bond was withdrawn.
The court further ordered all cases filed by defendants
consolidated so defendants' various claims could be determined and
equitable proration of the bond amount could be made by the court.
(R-237)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Appellants Dale Christiansen and John W. Whiteley
(represented by David K. Smith) and Roger T. Russell and Lewis Ted
Cowley (represented by David M. Swope) joined on appeal by defendant
United Bank (represented by Carl Kingston) and defendant-cross
appellant Gwyn D. Davidson (represented by Bruce Findlay) all seek
a judgment in this court that the bond company is liable to each
separate claimant up to a maximum of $20,000 per claim.

2
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Plaintiff-cross-appellant bond company seeks a judgment in
this court that its liability is limited to a maximum of $20,000
regardless of the number of claimants, amount of claims or times
the losses occurred or number of premiums paid.
Defendants-cross-respondents Resort Campers Ltd., Des Townsend
-and Glen Hatch agree with defendants that this court should determine
that the liability of the bond company is $20,000 per claimant and,
in addition, that if this court does not so rule that the declaratory
judgment of the lower court that the liability of the bond company
1s

$20,000 per paid premium period should be affirmed.

This brief, filed by defendants Resort Campers Ltd., Des Townsenc
and Glen Hatch, responds to the bond company's brief and its cross
appeal on the issue of whether the liability of the bond company
is at least $20,000 per paid premium period.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants Resort Campers Ltd., Des Townsend and Glen Hatch
agree that some of the essential facts are set forth in the bond
company's brief.

However, that statement of facts is so interlaced

with misleading, selfserving bond company contentions not found as
facts by the trial court it is necessary to summarize other relevant
evidence.
A.

Origin of the Subject Bond Form.
Bond company agent Robert L. Blackham testified it was

customary to use the dealer bond form which is the subject of this
case, because the same had evidently been approved by the Attorney
General. (R-320)

The director of the Motor Vehicle Business

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Administration, John A. Burt, testified that the Motor. Vehicle
Business Administration would accept whatever bond f~rm was approved
by the Attorney General (R-359), and that any language changes of
any sort, both those decreasing and those increasing the scope of
the bond, would be rejected unless and until the same had been approved
by the Attorney General. (R-372, 381)

Former Attorney General Robert

Hansen testified that he served as Attorney General from January 1977
to January 1981 (R-438), and that he served in the office of the
attorney general eight years before that time. (R-445).

He had no

specific recollection as to whether the bond form in question had
been presented for evaluation or approval during his tenure in office
(R-443) and could only say that, 1n general, the Attorney General's
office would review forms to see if they complied with the particular
statute in question, but that in less than one-half of one percent
of the cases would the Attorney General's office do any drafting.
(R-440)

He indicated

that it would be the general policy of the

Attorney General's office to approve forms that would increase public
protection beyond that required by a specific statute. (R-441)
No conversations at all took place, much less any discussion
of "intent of the parties" as to what the bond meant when Dick Noren
and/or his wife Lavonne Noren applied for the bond. (R-295)

Both the

bond company and the Motor Vehicle Business Administration were
permitted to partly testify and partly agree, over objection, with
bond counsel's interpretation that the premiums only buy $20,000
in protection and that the statute limits bond coverage to only
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$20,000, regardless of the number of claims or claimants or when

claims arise. (R-344,371)
B.

·Bond Company Ptactice
About 1200 motor vehicle dealer bonds of the kind in

question are issued or renewed for Utah motor vehicle dealers annually.
(R-427)

The premiums charged for these bonds are apparently determined

on the basis of rates fixed by the Surety Association of America, a
"rate fixing organization." (R-332, 344)

The premium is $20.00 per

$1,000 in bond coverage per annum. (R-343)

charged regardless of dealer volume.

The same premium is

(R-388) [This results in

annual premium revenue from Utah bonded dealers of approximately
$480,000.00.]

No bond claims losses are anticipated by the bonding companies
who issue motor vehicle dealer bonds.

(R~332,

344, 396)

It is bond company practice to investigate dealer bond applicants
and to require financial statements and information concerning the
applicant's business reputation.

(R~394,

411-12)

This "underwriting

file" is updated annually when renewal premiums are billed. (R-387,
404-05, 408, 415-16)

The bond company could have refused Noren's bond application
had it determined him to be an unacceptable risk. (R-394)

If

financial--information shows insufficient liquid assets or insufficient
net worth or an unfavorable Dun & Bradstreet report, the bond does
not issue or 1s not renewed or is cancelled because the bond company
does not accept any probability of loss. (R~338, 411-12)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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N.E.2d 617, 673 {Mass. 1973), a case cited by defendants in
support of the Dobbs rule, in which the court actually declined
to apply Dobbs.

The court reasoned in part as follows:

It might be appropriate for us to reconsider

our present rule in the light of the New
Jersey rule as laid down in the case of
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, supra, if
we had before us a case involving a
"substantial inequity of bargaining power,
position or advantage between the broker and
the other party involved." Perhaps such a
case might be one involving a broker and a
person selling his residence once in his
lifetime and where the contracting buyer
accepted by the seller is in fact not ready,
able and willing to complete the purchase on
the agreed date for conveyance.
291 N.E.2d at 624.

The Dobbs ruling conflicts with F.M.A.

Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670
(1965) discussed above, and plaintiff respectfully contends that
Dobbs is not the law in Utah.
It is clear from the decisions of the New Jersey courts that

the Dobbs decision would not be applied by them in this case as
proposed by defendants.

In Kennedy v. Roach, 122 N.J. Super.

361, 300 A.2d 570 (1973), sellers obtained a buyer for their

motel through the broker, Kennedy, who agreed to take $3,000 of
his commission down and the balance at a later time.
case at bar, the buyer paid a down payment and

~ent

Like the
into

possession, and then defaulted, and the buyer retook possession
and retained the amount paid.

The estate of the broker sued for

the balance of the brokerage fees, and the defendants contended
the commission was contingent upon the buyer's payment of further

-19-
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commissions.

The court said, in ordering judgment to enter as a

matter of law for the broker and in reversing the trial court,
that-We are, of course, well aware of the landmark
holding of Ellsworth Dobbs Inc. v. Johnson
•

•

•

However, Dobbs did not deal with a situation
such as is here involved • • •
Under the circumstances of this case we find
no "inequality of bargaining power, position
or advantage" between the broker and the
seller, nor any inequity or unconscionability
which militates against the entitlement of
plaintiff to his $9,000 commission as of the
time when the buyer went into possession and
took over the operation of the motel, albeit
payment of $6,000 thereof was to be deferred
to September 15, 1970.
Kennedy v. Roach, supra, at 571-72.

Similarly, in the case at

bar the parties dealt with one another voluntarily and in a
commercial setting; the defendants had purchased the propety
earlier in a transaction in which they dealt with the plaintiff.
Plaintiff respectfully suggests, therefore, that the Dobbs rule
would not be applied to this case even if it were subject to New
Jersey law.
Ferrara v. Firsching, 533 P.2d 1351

(Nev. 1975) does not aid

defendants; like Real Estate Exchange v. Kingston, 18 Utah 2d
254, 420 P.2d 117 (1966), it involved an explicit agreement that
broke~'s

commission was to be paid from purchase money as it was

received.

-20-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Point IV
The trial court properly found no material issue
of fact in defendants claim that thev did not
sign as individuals

Defendants advance the proposition that the note is not
integrated, and that therefore they are entitled to present
extrinsic evidence to show that they did not sign it as
individuals.

As noted above,

§70A-3~403

provides presumptively

for liability of a representative on a note like the one in suit,
and therefore it would seem that such evidence would not raise a
material issue of fact.

Defendants argue as also noted above

that other documents involved in the sale of the

Sa~dy

Ranch seem

in their view to support their claim that they did not sign as
individuals.
is plain.

This argument cannot stand, however, since the note

The rule is provided in 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and

Notes §726 that-If an obliger understands, or should
understand, the language and effect of a note
when he signs it, and executes it willingly,
without being seduced by the fraud of the
obligee, he .ought not to be, and he is never,
permitted to dispute or deny its obligation,
according to its legal and rational
construction.

Ignorance of the contents of the agreement is similarly not
a basis for attacking its clear meaning.

In Garff Realty Co. v.

Better Building, Inc., 120 Utah 344, 234 P.2d 842 (1951 ), the
defendant's attorney had proposed a question to an officer of
defendant whether the officer knew certain terms of the agreement
-21-
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involved in suit when it was signed.

Objection to this question

was sustained, and the defense of the defendant that the officer
was not aware of all the terms of the contract and

"'~
l~

was not

the intention of the defendant to become bound for the payment of
any commission," was held to be insufficient to state a defense.
The court adopted the following reasoning:
To permit a party, when sued on a written
contract, to admit that he signed it but to
deny that it expresses the agreement he made
or to allow him to admit that he signed it
but did not read it or know its stipulations
would absolutely destroy the value of all
contracts.
234 P.2d at 844.

The court observed further that there were no

issues of fraud or mutual mistake raised, as none have been in
the case at bar, (Minute Entry, Record at 100), and therefore the
court sustained a directed verdict.
The Federal District Court for the District of Utah has
granted summary judgment over similar objections in E.F. Hutton
and Co., Inc. v. Schank, 456 F. Supp. 507 (D. Utah 1976), where
the plaintiff securities broker sought to enforce an arbitration
clause in a contract between the securities broker and its
customer, the customer claiming that its attention had been
distracted from this clause by an inadequate presentation f the
contract's meaning and that therefore the contract was invalid.
The court observed that the mistake, if any had occurred, had
been solely that of defendant and was not mutual, and that
because the plaintiff's agent had informed defendant that the
contract was for the good of plaintiff there had been no
unilateral mistake either, and that the signature was genuine,

-22-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and therefore summary judgment should enter

enforci~g

the

arbitration clause.
The defense that the defendants had not signed the note in
their individual capacities was not raised in the case at bar
until after plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was on file
and until after the plaintiff had taken the deposition of
defendant Robert S. Nielson, relying in taking that deposition on
the state of the pleadings as a guide to the scope of the issues
in the suit.

This claim was not alleged in the answer, nor was

it based on any facts not in possession of the defendants at the
time of filing the answer.

In these circumstances the discretion

of the court to deny defendants the right to raise this issue by
amendment was properly exercised.

See, Dupler vs. Yates, 20 Utah

2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960)(liberality of rule permitting
amendment to pleadings "not without limit"); Bradford v. Alvey &
Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah, 1980)("Such an amendment [to conform
pleadings to evidence] should be allowed by the court only when
it will serve the purpose of the rule, which is to further the
interests of justice • . • More importantly, there is nothing in
the record, nor in the facts as viewed by the trial court, which
would provide a basis upon which the defendants should be
es topped

• • •" )

Thus the trial judge ruled correctly when he said-In this matter the court finds that there are
no facts alleged by defendants from which the
court could conclude that the note upon which
plaintiff brings suit is unclear, ambiguous,
or was procured by fraud, duress or undue
influence. It is the further finding of this
court that there are no facts in dispute
relating to the genuineness of the document
-23-
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and the signatures being that of the parties
who they represent. Accordingly the court
finds that the note speaks for itself and
that there is no basis to allow parole
evidence to alter the face of the instrument
•

•

•

(Record at 100)

Point V
There was no condition in the obligation of defendants
to pay the note or of N-Bar to pay broker's fees

The most troubling thing about the claim of defendants that
there is a condition in their obligation to pay under the note is
that it is inconsistent with the documents produced by them as
extrinsic evidence of the claimed condition.

The brokerage

contract provides for no extension of time or condition, the note
is unconditional, the escrow agreement expresses no condition,
and the other documents are relevant only to establish that
plaintiff did in fact earn its commission by obtaining a binding
contract of sale for N-Bar Corporation.

Thus the claim

t~at

there was a condition appears to be more a belated and unilateral
proposal from defendants designed to meet the exigencies of
litigation that to describe fairly the state of the contract.
The cases proposed by defendants to support the proposition
that they should be permitted to prove a condition are not
persuasive on this issue.

Ventures, Inc., v. Jones, 101 Idaho

837, 623 P.2d 145 (1981 ), for example, involved six promissory
notes which were given as interim security and which were

-24-
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replaced by a mortgage intended as permanent security.

The court

said--

Based upon its findings showing the
circumstances of the note transaction and the
close involvement of all the parties
concerned, the district court concluded that
the notes had been given and received for the
special purpose of interim security and were
to serve only a additional security until
substitute security could be provided in the
form of a mortgage from appellant.
Id. at 150.

The analogy of Ventures to the case at bar would be

sound if for example the corporation seller, N-Bar Corporation,
had paid plaintiff all its broker's fees and then plaintiff had

brought suit upon the note.

In such a situation the liability on

the note would of course be extinguished.

Here, however, N-Bar

Corporation has not performed; it might be said on plaintiff's
behalf that the contingency against which the note was· obtained
has indeed been realized and now plaintiff is seeking to obtain
the broker's fees under the note, exactly what was intended when
it obtained the individual signatures of the defendants.
Furthermore, defendants have presented the extrinsic evidence
they propose in opposition to summary judgment, as required by
Rule 56, and a perusal of it shows that defendants seek not to
prove that the mutually agreed purpose of the note was subject to
a condition, but that they will now testify that their implicit

and unrevealed intention at the time was in conflict with the
plain legal meaning of the note, and that therefore they should
be exonerated.
Another case cited by defendants, Aird Insurance Agency v.
Zion's First National Bank, 612 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) does not

-25-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

support the relief they seek herein.

The plaintiff Aird knew

that Fitzen had a deposit at Zion's which had been pledged to
Transamerica to secure a contractor's bond.

This assignment was

absolute in form, but was intended for security, and at the time
of the events pertinent to the case, the bond had been satisfied
by the completion of the contractor's project and Transamerica
had concluded for its own internal purposes that it had no
further claim upon the bank deposit.

Nevertheless, Aird, which

had a judgment against Fitzen, garnished Transamerica and
obtained an assignment of the bank deposit, represented by a
passboo'k.

In the meantime, the defendant Zion's Bank had

depleted the account to set off against against a debt owed to it
by Fitzen, and Aird sued to compel the bank to reverse the setoff
and give Aird the money which had originally been in the account
The court looked behind the exact wording of the assignment
to the understanding of the parties, which was that the
assignment would have no more force once the contract protected
by the bond was satisfactorily completed.

Under these facts the

assignment was deemed to have expired and lost its force.
court permitted proof of these facts and made the following
observation:
Satisfaction of an obligation secured by a
pledge terminates, as a matter of law, the
pledgee's rights in the collateral. Such
termination is inherent in the definition of
a security interest. Transamerica's interest
having terminated before Fitzen ever
defaulted on his loan, defendant moved
against funds in the account now solely owned
by ~itzen, Transamerica merely holding the
account passbook without right, which might
be likened to a constructive trust.
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The

Id. at 344. The point here is that in the case at bar defendant
has not raised a material issue of fact supporting a defense oE
the type discussed in either Ventures or Aird; there is no
evidence proffered of a mutual agreement that the note would be
conditional or that defendants would not be individually liable,
nor is there a showing of discharge of the underlying obligation,
and thus there is nothing to· overcome plaintiff's prirna facie
case on the note.
This mutuality of understanding is crucial to defendants'
case and the lack of it is fatal.

Therefore defendants obtain no

assistance from FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617
P.2d 327 (Utah 1980), a case cited by them to support the claim
that the note was conditional.

FMA agreed to lease some

equipment, including a silo for corn, to Hansen Dairy, which took
the lease which the reservation that the silo had to be in place
for the current year's harvest.

The court said--

Significantly, the court found that there was
no contact directly between the plaintiff and
the defendants, "but all of the dealings were
done by or through the Levies." Thus, a key
proposition to be borne in mind as bearing on
all of the issues in this case is that Mr.
Mayme, acting for the plaintiff, entrusted
the handling of its interests in this
transaction to Mr. Levie. Consequently, his
knowledge in that regard should be imputed to
it.
Id. at 329-330.

Levie testified that he had understood the

contract to require the silo to be in place for the current year,
corroborating the testimony of Hansen Dairy, and the court then
concluded that there had been an agreement that the lease would
not go into effect if the~ silo was not installed in time, and
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when it was not, the court released Hansen Dairy from the lease.
The role of Levie as representative of FMA supplied the element
of mutuality to the claim of Hansen Dairy that there was an
agreement precedent to the lease, because through Levie

th~

plaintiff FMA knew of and assented to the condition that the silo
be furnished before the harvest began and also through Levie the
plaintiff knew that the silo was not finished at the time the
original lease was signed.
In the case at bar, however, the defendants make no showing
of mutuality in their claim that the note was subject to a
condition and they point to no facts which would establish that
there was any agreement establishing a condition; their defense
rests upon their unsupported assertion that there was such an
intent in their mind.

Plaintiff respectfully urges that this

claim fails to overcome the prima facie case established on the
note and that therefore the judgment should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

This is not a case in which there is disagreement about what
happened.

After listening to his attorney take the deposition of

Kathleen Bagley, the defendant Robert

s.

Nielson gave the

following answer:
(Mr. Findlay) You were here at the
deposition, during Mrs. Bagley's deposition?
Q:

A:

(Mr. Nielson)

I did.
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Q: Are there any points in her deposition
that come to mind that you differ with her?
A:

No.

(Nielson deposition at 3)

What is at issue in the within matter

is the application of law to the facts presented.
Plaintiff submits that the law is as follows:

1) the

Uniform Commercial Code requires that a signer of a negotiable
instrument is liable individually upon an instrument which does
not bear the name of a person whom the signer allegedly
represents as an agent; 2) Under the contract for brokerage in
this case, the broker's fee was earned upon the sale, and the
acceptance of the buyer by the seller waived any question as to
his ability, and 3) the law does not imply a condition that a
buyer will finish all payment of installments on· a purchase
contract before the seller is required to pay broker's fees; this
requirement would force brokers to insist upon payment in full at
closing in every case, and would be to the disadvantage of
sellers in general.
In view of the record and the foregoing

plaintiff urges the

co~rt

proposi~ions

to conclude that the court below

properly entered summary judgment and to affirm.
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of law
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